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Abstract
Law and economics theorists have long advanced theories of litigation and settlement,
including the canonical Priest and Klein (1984) model that predicts that, as
settlement rates rise, plaintiff win rates approach 50%. Empiricists have tested this
and other predictions from the theoretical literature, finding qualified support for the
Priest and Klein model. So far, though, this literature has relied primarily on data
from the U.S. Yet, because this model rests on simple assumptions about human
behavior in the context of a legal dispute, not on any distinctive features of American
litigation, its basic insights should apply everywhere. In this paper, we put the
universality of the Priest and Klein model to the test, using a unique administrative
data set from Taiwan, comprising about a half-million observations. We find strongly
suggestive evidence in favor of the Priest and Klein model. We consider variants of
the model incorporating risk aversion and compare results testing potential
implications of models of settlement under asymmetric information.
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I. Introduction
How much can theories of suit and settlement developed in the context of one,
specific legal system (the US) tell us about other legal systems, and how much can
data from other legal systems tell us about theories of suit and settlement? In this
paper, we explore these questions, with application to the use of unusually
comprehensive data on civil court cases from Taiwan to explore empirical predictions
of the canonical Landes-Posner-Gould and Priest and Klein (1984) models of
litigation and settlement. In so doing, we generate new evidence of common patterns
in litigation across widely diverse institutional settings, but also identify some of the
challenges that arise in translating a model of litigation to a new context.
There are, of course, major differences in the design of court systems across
jurisdictions, and a robust body of theoretical work examines some of the better
known and perhaps most consequential differences (such as the American and
English rules for allocation of attorney fees). Nonetheless, some theories of litigation
and settlement are sufficiently general that they should hold across legal systems,
even quite distinct ones. For example, the Landes-Posner-Gould model of litigation
predicts that higher-stakes disputes will be less likely to settle than lower-stakes
disputes, and the Priest and Klein model predicts that as the trial rate in any set of
cases approaches zero, the plaintiff ’s rate of prevailing at trial will converge on 50
percent. These predictions rest on a model of human behavior in the context of a legal
dispute, not on any distinctive features of US litigation. They should be true
everywhere.
But are they? We don’t know, largely because there has been little or no evidence
collected on this question to date. What little we have in terms of empirical studies of
these hypotheses almost always uses data from US courts. Yet, we might think that
data from courts outside the US present a better—i.e., more rigorous—test of models
like Priest and Klein (1984). These were developed with the US legal system in mind,
and so by looking for the same phenomena in a different legal system, we can conduct
an “out of sample” test; we can assess the “external validity” of a theory that, by its
own internal logic, should apply equally in civil law or common law countries, and in
unitary or federal court systems.
Nor is the empirical testing of economic models of litigation an exercise of purely
academic interest. These models shape how we evaluate the legal system (both
positively and normatively). The Priest and Klein model, for example, predicts that

1
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changes in legal standards may favor plaintiffs, but the selection of cases into
settlement and trial will mean that we cannot detect the change by looking for a rise
in plaintiffs winning at trial. (Instead, more cases that plaintiffs would win may
settle instead.) If this insight is correct, then we cannot—as lawyers and
commentators often do—infer from high win rates for defendants that the law favors
defendants.
Models also guide the formation of agendas for improving the legal system. These
models imply prescriptions for changing the system, depending on our goals. For
example, let’s say that we want to encourage settlement, in order to reduce the
expenses associated with litigation, and allow parties to obtain relief faster. If this is
our goal, different models of litigation identify different culprits for why parties fail
to settle:
The Priest and Klein model assumes that settlement failure is the product of
parties who are equally (yet incompletely) informed about the merits of a case, but
who are optimistically biased about their chances of winning. (For this reason, the
Landes-Posner-Gould model and the Priest and Klein model are called “divergent
expectations” models.) Because both parties overestimate their chances of winning,
they cannot agree on a settlement amount. The difference in their perceived chances
of winning outweighs the fact that they both save litigation costs by settling.
The policy prescriptions that might flow from this include identifying sources of
optimism bias in clients and lawyers, and designing legal procedures to incorporate
de-biasing techniques, informed by psychology and behavioral economics. To some
extent, the US legal system may do this already—legal representation is
commonplace in US courts, and a growing body of evidence shows that a person
acting on behalf of another (i.e., an attorney) is less prone to cognitive bias than a
person acting on their own behalf (i.e., the client). See, e.g., Arlen and Tontrup (2015).
Alternatively, or in addition, reducing sources of mutual uncertainty would reduce
the range in which biases could affect behavior. A tort system with highly predictable,
rather than discretionary, judgments about liability and damages might accomplish
this (see, e.g., Ramseyer 2015: 10–70).
Other canonical models, such as Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
assume that settlement failure is the product of asymmetric information between the
parties—one party knows something that the other does not. (For this reason, these
models are called “asymmetric information” models.) For example, the defendant
knows the extent of its negligence, but the plaintiff does not. Because of information
asymmetry, the less-informed party does not know how much to settle for, and thus
2
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that party will sometimes risk trial rather than agree to a lowball settlement. One
obvious policy prescription that might flow from this is to eliminate information
asymmetry. Of course, this is exactly the policy that the US federal courts have
followed since the implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
Asymmetric information may exist when a complaint is filed, but broad discovery
should eliminate information asymmetries before trial.
The US legal system is, in many ways, unique. In Taiwan, the country from which
our data comes, attorney representation is much less common, and there is no such
thing as broad discovery. Further, settlement rates in Taiwan are very low—below
25%—which is far below settlement rates in US federal courts—which exceed 60%.
But why aren’t cases settling? Is it the lack of lawyers? The lack of discovery? Or
something else? Should courts in Taiwan become more like courts in the US? Or vice
versa?
Thus, the answer to the question “What should we do?” depends on which model
or models we think effectively describe the real world. In other words, while all of
these models are theoretically sound, determining how well they predict real-world
empirical outcomes is an important step toward transforming theoretical insights
about law and economics into concrete proposals for legal reform.
This paper takes precisely this step, examining which theoretical model passes
muster in the real world. We draw empirical predictions from the theoretical
literature on litigation and settlement and test those predictions against our data.
We seek to get a grip on which theoretical models of litigation and settlement seem to
work tolerably well as an approximation of what is happening in the real world. To
the extent that a model’s predictions are supported by the data, we can be more
confident that the model may be a useful guide in prescriptive analysis. And if its
predictions are rejected, more caution is warranted.
Of course, we know a priori that none of the theories are perfect. Human behavior
in general, and the legal system in particular, are too complex for any simple theory
to work with high accuracy. But in our view, a rough guide is better than no guide,
and empirical data on the success or failure of a model’s predictions also provides
fodder for newer and better models. And while no single empirical study can provide
conclusive evidence for or against a model, this paper presents a large set of robust
empirical results, based on unusually rich data.
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature testing the empirical predictions
of theoretical models of suit and settlement. We take advantage of a dataset of civil
cases from Taiwan that is more comprehensive in its coverage of cases than most US
3
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datasets and that provides detailed and consistent measurement of stakes, a
quantity that is particularly hard to find in extant US datasets. We test the two
predictions of the Priest and Klein and Landes-Posner-Gould models noted above, as
well as several corollary or competing predictions drawn from the empirical
literature that has sought to test these models, including Kessler, Meites, and Miller
(1996), Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999), Waldfogel (1995), and Waldfogel (1998). Our
main result is that we find both qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the
Priest and Klein (1984) model, including its famous 50% prediction noted above. Our
analysis finds mixed support for competing hypotheses, and rejects the hypothesis
that asymmetric information will push plaintiff win rates away from 50% as trial
rates approach zero. 1
Taken together, these results tend to confirm the predictions of the Priest and
Klein model, while providing less support for predictions consistent with existing
models of asymmetric information. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they
are strongly suggestive, and we believe that further empirical testing of these same
models using other hypotheses and data is merited. Based upon our results, we very
tentatively conclude that models based on behavioral factors, such as optimism bias,
may have more empirical relevance in explaining litigation and settlement than
models based on one-sided asymmetric information. 2
The rest of this article is as follows: Part II summarizes relevant portions of the
prior literature on litigation and settlement, and concludes with a discussion of
important caveats from the literature about the unique challenges faced by
empiricists attempting to distinguish between theoretical models of litigation and
settlement. Part III gives an overview of the Taiwanese legal system. Part IV
describes the pertinent data. Part V lays out the hypotheses crystalized from the
prior literature and reports our empirical results. Part VI concludes.

In addition, in Appendix A, we utilize this data to test other predictions from the literature
on litigation and settlement, which are distinct from predictions that would distinguish the
Priest and Klein model from its alternatives. Contrary to US experience, the presence of legal
representation (rather than pro se parties) is not associated with higher settlement rates, and
we discuss possible reasons for this difference. Also, we find that corporations have higher win
rates than individuals, consistent with the claim that repeat players will have higher win
rates, and represented parties win more often than pro se parties.
2 Note that the canonical asymmetric information models assume one-sided private
information. Because the Priest and Klein model can be rationalized as a model of two-sided
private information (Lee and Klerman 2015; Lee and Klerman 2016), our results should be
understood as tending to reject models of one-sided asymmetric information, not models of
asymmetric information generally.
1
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II. Literature on Litigation and Settlement

A. The Canonical Models and the Empirical Literature
What drives parties to a dispute into litigation, and what leads them to
settlement, have long been studied in the economic analysis of law. Canonical models
were first developed in the 1970s. Landes (1971: 102) points out that the differences
in parties’ estimates of liability and damages, risk-aversion, and the relative costs of
settlement and trials affect whether parties settle or litigate. Gould (1973: 296)
emphasizes the import of parties’ degree of agreement on the plaintiff ’s probability of
winning at trial. Posner (1973) discusses the effect of judicial error costs, judicial
delay, costs of litigation and settlement, and mutual optimism. The synthesis of these
papers is often referred to as the Landes-Posner-Gould (or LPG) model. This model
treats parties as wealth-maximizing actors whose decisions maximize their perceived
net payoffs in litigation. A plaintiff will file suit if the probability of winning at trial,
times the amount in dispute, is greater than the cost of litigation. Each party will be
willing to settle if the settlement amount is higher than the expected verdict at trial.
In this framework, if the parties have the same expectation of the probability that
the plaintiff wins at trial, settlement is inevitable. Because litigation is costly for
both parties, there is a range of settlement amounts that both parties would prefer to
trial. For example, a settlement for the plaintiff ’s probability of winning times the
amount in dispute would replicate the expected outcome from trial, but both parties
would save litigation costs. For this reason, the LPG framework rationalizes
trial—i.e., failure to settle—as the product of “divergent expectations” about the
plaintiff ’s likelihood of winning. If each party is optimistic about their chances, then
the plaintiff will tend to demand more, and the defendant will tend to demand less, in
settlement. If the stakes are high enough, or the cost of going to trial is low enough,
divergent expectations about the parties’ odds at trial may make settlement
impossible. Thus, in this framework, settlement becomes more likely as litigation
costs rise relative to stakes or as mutual optimism diminishes.
The LPG model have been developed, extended, and criticized over more than
three decades. Its prediction that settlement rates fall as stakes rise relative to costs
has been challenged in theoretical grounds. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989: 1077) and
Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996: 246) argue that risk-averse parties will tend to
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settle rather than litigate when stakes are high. 3
Building on the LPG model, Priest and Klein (1984) describe a model that
generates a number of dramatic predictions about litigation. They posit, if parties
have expectations about their chances at trial that are unbiased and fairly accurate,
then mutual optimism will lead to settlement failure only in relatively “close”
cases—cases where the plaintiff ’s probability of winning is close to 50%. Importantly,
this logic generates empirically testable hypotheses. Lee and Klerman (2016: 60)
enumerate six concrete hypotheses originating from Priest and Klein (1984):

First, the “trial selection hypothesis” states that litigated cases are not a random
or representative sample of all disputes. This is widely considered as the most
important contribution of Priest and Klein (1984) (Lee and Klerman 2016). There has
been little theoretical or empirical challenge to this hypothesis, although Helland,
Klerman, and Lee (2017 forthcoming) find that, in a data set from New York state
courts, the distributions of damage awards in judicial decisions and in settlements
are very similar, suggesting that there is at least one occasion where there is no
selection into settlement based on expected value of the claim.

Second, the strong selection during the litigation process produces the “no
inferences hypothesis”, suggesting that “no inferences can be made about the law or
legal decision-makers from the plaintiff win rates” (Lee and Klerman 2016). This
claim has been challenged by Klerman and Lee (2014).

Third, there is the conjecture that plaintiff trial win rates converge toward 50%
as the trial rate falls. This is the most famous of the predictions and the one to which
the empirical literature has devoted the most attention.

Fourth, regardless of the legal standard (favoring plaintiffs, defendants, or
neither), the plaintiff trial win rate will demonstrate a strong tendency toward 50%,
as compared to the percentage of cases plaintiff would have won if all cases went to
trial.

Fifth, the plaintiff trial win rate will be unrelated to the shape of the distribution
of disputes.

Sixth, Priest and Klein (1984: 24–26) contends that asymmetric stakes will push

Landes (1971: 99), in the criminal law context, points out that the greater the defendant’s
aversion to risk, the more likely that a settlement is to take place. Huang (2016: 385) uses
data from face-to-face surveys in Taiwan to study out-of-court settlement behaviors, and finds
that the amount of claim (X-axis) and estimated settlement probability (Y-axis) have an
inverted U-shape relationship. That is, settlement rates are highest when the stakes are
medium, neither high nor low.
3
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plaintiff trial win rates away from 50%; that is, parties that systematically have
larger stakes will tend to win more often.
The most important challenge for any model of human behavior, of course, is to
generate empirical predictions that survive the rigorous testing of such predictions.
The Priest and Klein (or PK) model, and the LPG framework upon which it builds,
have attracted its share of attention in this regard, as studies have both questioned
and supported its empirical prediction (among others) that, as the share of cases that
are litigated as opposed to settled goes to zero, the fraction of cases won by plaintiffs
converges to 50%.
Most of the empirical articles to date use observational data to test the PK model.
The literature has generated mixed results in terms of how closely litigation
outcomes fit the PK hypotheses. Eisenberg (1990: 341) fits the distribution of plaintiff
win rates over a binomial distribution (with p=0.5) to test the 50% limit hypothesis.
Using administrative data on US federal courts, Eisenberg (1990: 348–51) finds that
the distribution of plaintiff win rates across districts and case types does not support
the Priest-Klein model. He concludes that the 50% limit hypothesis should be
rejected (see also Eisenberg 1991).
A number of studies, however, find support for the PK model when testing other
predictions of the model. Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) use administrative data
from the US federal courts to generate proxy measures for the degree of asymmetry
of stakes, the amount of uncertainty in parties’ estimates of the strength of the
plaintiff ’s case, the settlement rate, and the plaintiff win rate for several categories of
cases. They then use a structural model to predict settlement rates and plaintiff win
rates based on the measures of asymmetry of stakes and uncertainty. By comparing
the predictions of the structural model with the observed settlement rates and
plaintiff wins, they attempt to test the predictive power of the PK model. They find
mixed support for the model in the data.
Waldfogel (1998) uses the same administrative data from Siegelman and
Waldfogel (1999) to compare predictions of the PK model with predictions of
asymmetric information (or AI) models. Bebchuk (1984) presents the canonical
screening model and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) present the canonical signaling
model. In these canonical models of litigation and settlement in an environment of
one-sided asymmetric information, better-informed parties with stronger cases are
more willing to go to trial, and thus as trial rates appraoch zero, only the
better-informed parties with the strongest cases litigate. Thus, as cases become more
highly selected due to settlement, Priest and Klein predict that plaintiff win rates
7
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will converge to 50%, while AI models predicts that the win rate of the
better-informed party with converge to 100%. Comparing plaintiff win rates across
case categories in the early stages of litigation with win rates in the late stages of
litigation, Waldfogel (1998) finds a clear convergence toward 50% as litigation
progresses, and concludes that this supports the Priest and Klein 50% prediction but
rejects the AI models.
Waldfogel (1995; 1998) also tackles the fifty-percent limit hypothesis by
examining the relationship between settlement rates and plaintiff win rates, using
the same data. As the 50% win rate will be attained in the limit as the number of
trials falls, higher settlement rates should be associated with plaintiff win rates
closer to 50%. Waldfogel (1995: 244–45) finds that the prediction holds when
settlement rates and win rates are computed by judge and case type. Case types that
have low settlement rates produced either very high (close to 1) or very low (close to 0)
plaintiff win rates, whereas those that have high settlement rates led to plaintiff win
rates around 50%. He argues that the data is consistent with the PK model but not AI
models.
Siegelman and Donohue (1995: 431) use administrative data from employment
discrimination cases in US federal court and find support for two predictions of the
PK model: first, the strongest and weakest cases are more likely to settle, and second,
the party with higher stakes will tend to have higher win rates in litigated cases.
(These are the first and sixth predictions listed above.) Siegelman and Donohue also
note that the business cycle predicts patterns in the filing and settlement of
employment discrimination cases. This result, while intuitive, does weaken one of the
stronger (i.e., more ambitious) predictions of the PK hypothesis, which is that
plaintiff win rates will bear no relation to changes in the underlying distribution of
disputes. This finding lends support to Klerman and Lee’s (2014) argument that,
except in the limiting case of trial rates going to zero, selection effects attenuate but
do not eliminate the effect of legal changes and changes in the underlying
distribution of cases on plaintiff win rates at trial.
One recent paper attempts to test the 50% prediction with data from Chinese
courts. Cui and Wang (2017) use administrative data on litigation against Chinese
administrative agencies and, in the spirit of Waldfogel (1995), compare plaintiff win
rates and adjudication rates across agency types and years. They find a strong
negative relationship between adjudication rates and plaintiff win rates, a result that
is consistent with Priest and Klein, given that plaintiff win rates tend to be below
50% in their data—thus, as the adjudication rate tends towards zero, win rates tend
8
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toward 50%.
Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989) examine Japanese data on litigation over
wrongful deaths in automobile crashes. (They use 26 years of data, comprising
766,948 Japanese court decisions, which makes their data set the largest in the
literature.) They note an 80% plaintiff win rate but search for plausible theoretical
reasons to explain why the finding could be consistent with the Priest-Klein model.
In this way, Ramseyer and Nakazato do not so much test the PK model as incorporate
factors such as asymmetric litigation costs and asymmetric risk aversion to fit the
model to the data.
Some data sets have brought otherwise unobservable quantities into the analysis,
something that we also do below with the Taiwanese administrative data. Most
notable in this respect is Klerman (2012), who utilizes data on thirteenth-century
English jury verdicts in criminal cases to test predictions derived from the PK
model. 4 The most distinctive feature of Klerman’s data set is that it includes jury
verdicts from settled cases. (For the cases in Klerman’s data, juries operated
independently of the parties, akin to a modern grand jury, rather than petit jury.)
Unlike any modern data set, this data set thus provides (what would otherwise be)
the “counterfactual” outcome that would have obtained in the absence of settlement.
Klerman (2012) focuses on the sixth of the PK hypotheses, i.e., that the party with
the higher stakes will have the higher win rate in litigated (in Klerman’s data,
non-settled) case. In the criminal context, this is the defendant, and Klerman’s
results support this prediction of the PK model.
Finally, some experimental work has been done on the Landes-Posner-Gould
framework. Stanley and Coursey (1990) conducted a laboratory experiment in which
subjects engaged in simulated pretrial bargaining. The experiment varied litigation
costs and the precision of the parties’ estimates of the trial outcome. Consistent with
the Landes-Posner-Gould framework, settlement rates rose as litigation costs rose
and as parties’ expectations about the strength of the plaintiff ’s case were based on
more precise estimates of the trial outcome. 5

Because criminal cases were privately prosecuted at that time, Klerman argues that this
data set is appropriate for testing theories developed to explain civil litigation.
5 Other noteworthy extensions and criticisms include: Lee and Klerman (2015) propose
modifications to the original Priest-Klein model, such as considering whether parties use
Bayes’ rule to refine their estimates. Loewenstein et al. (1993: 138–40) challenge the
psychological foundation of the Priest-Klein model, as their experiments found that egocentric
human nature induces parties to make biased estimate of case values and the magnitude of
the bias is a strong predictor of nonsettlement. It is worth noting that Loewenstein et al. did
4
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One difficulty faced by this literature is that many of the relevant variables in the
models (such as party optimism, stakes, or costs) are not observable in the data, and
empirical researchers must rely upon rough proxies. Consequently, what counts as a
“rejection” of a model is open to debate. As Siegelman and Donohue (1995: 431) argue
(and present evidence to support), in realistic settings the selection effects predicted
by Priest and Klein will only be partial, so some variables may explain variations in
plaintiff win rate (contrary to the second and fifth predictions listed above). If these
variables are not observable to the researcher, however, it will be difficult to
distinguish a failure of the model from lack of sufficiently granular data. Take
asymmetric stakes as an example. No administrative data to date has included direct
measures of parties’ stakes. Asymmetry of stakes, however, could explain systematic
deviations in plaintiff win rates away from 50%.

B. To What Extent Are the Canonical Models Empirically Falsifiable at All?
Magnifying this concern are theoretical critiques that ask whether models of suit
and settlement, including the PK model, are falsifiable at all. These critiques are
associated with Shavell (1996: 493), who noted that models of litigation and
settlement can easily be tweaked so that they predict any plaintiff win rate at trial.
Strictly speaking, though, this claim is not a rejection of the empirical content of
Priest and Klein or other models, but rather a claim that different assumptions about
the (usually unobservable) information structure of litigation will lead to different
empirical predictions.
More recent work by Gelbach (2016), however, directly questions the empirical
content of the PK model. Gelbach shows that the Priest and Klein (1984), Bebchuk
(1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), and other important models of litigation and
settlement can be represented by a single, common, “reduced form” theoretical
framework that is consistent with the basic postulates of the PK model. If so, Gelbach
argues, discriminating empirically between the PK model and other, competing
models is virtually impossible, because any result, no matter how seemingly
consistent with another model, can be rationalized with the PK model for some

not test predictions of the Priest and Klein model; rather, they tested an assumption of the
model, which is unbiased prior estimates of the strength of the plaintiffs’ case. Their
laboratory experiment, which simulated pretrial settlement bargaining, found significant
self-serving bias by subjects. Although couched as a rejection of Priest and Klein, this result
seems to reinforce Priest and Klein’s predictions, as well as the earlier divergent-expectations
literature. Self-serving bias is a source of divergent expectations about trial outcome.
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parameter values in the “reduced form” model.
In principle, this concern could be overcome with sufficiently rich data on the
parameters of the model; for example, if we knew not only settlement rates and
plaintiff win rates, but also had some information on the extent of asymmetric
information, asymmetric stakes, and litigation costs, our ability to shoehorn data into
the PK model would be meaningfully constrained. Such rich data, however, is
unheard of currently.
We recognize the force of Gelbach’s critique. We treat it not as a reason to despair
in our empirical exercise, but rather as an all-important reminder of the need to
discipline any attempt to test competing models of litigation and settlement. As
Gelbach shows, it can be easy—not just rhetorically, but even as a matter of formal
theory—to rationalize seeming rejections of the PK model to fit the model by
adjusting our claims about unobserved quantities such as asymmetric stakes and
asymmetric information. Thus, to say that we can cleanly reject or support a model,
we must be sufficiently precise in defining ex ante the model we seek to reject or
support.
In this paper, we impose this discipline by testing the hypotheses we identify
under a strong ceteris paribus assumption: that unless we have a priori reasons for
suspecting systematic differences in asymmetric stakes, asymmetric information, or
the underlying distribution of case strength across categories of cases or parties, we
assume that these factors cannot explain major discrepancies between the
predictions of the original PK model and the data. We impose the same assumption to
the extent that we test predictions based on other, competing theories, too.
In other words, we make explicit the assumptions implicit in the original versions
of the canonical models: that unobservable parameter values are not so peculiar that
that the models will generate empirical results opposite from the results implied by
the original papers introducing the models. For example, we assume that case
quality is distributed such that the distribution of plaintiff ’s true chance of prevailing
has full support on the (0,1) interval. 6 (In English: we assume that there is a full
spectrum of case strength from slam-dunks for the plaintiff to slam-dunks for the
defendant.) We find this assumption to be uncontroversial, but it is just that: an

This assumption is essential for the prediction, noted above in our discussion of Waldfogel
(1995; 1998), that AI models predict that as settlement rates rise, plaintiff win rates will tend
to move away from 50%. Obviously, if case strength is bounded above or below by 50%, then in
the limit, plaintiff win rates can be 50% in AI models as well as in the PK model. But such a
strict assumption seems implausible a priori.
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assumption.
Given that reality is never as elegant as a simplified theoretical model, of course,
there is nothing unreasonable about recognizing that discrepancies could be due to
unobserved factors, but we take this approach to ensure that our empirical exercise
involves a meaningful test of competing models. In doing so, we deliberately make it
more difficult to find empirical support for any given model (including the PK model).
First, to the extent that our results tend to support the predictions of the PK model
(and we shall see that they tend to), stacking the deck against the PK model helps
increase our confidence that our findings are due to genuine robustness of that model
to variation in real-world settings, and not because we gave the model too much
“wiggle room” in letting it fit the data. Second, and more fundamentally, we want to
ensure that, if we do find that the data favors one model over another, that the choice
of models matters. A model that predicts that any outcome is possible is useless for
positive or prescriptive analysis; it is equivalent to having no model at all.
III. Background on Taiwanese Courts and Civil Litigation
Taiwan is a civil-law country. Most of its private laws resemble those in Germany
with influences from Japanese laws (Wang 2002; Huang 2009: 251; Chang 2016: 227–
228; Chang, Chen, and Wu 2017; Chang, Garoupa, and Wells 2017). American laws
have only occasionally been referenced in legal reforms. Taiwan has a unitary legal
system, unlike the United States’ federal system. In addition to a constitutional court
in charge of abstract, centralized, ex post constitutional review, there are
administrative courts that deal with disputes between citizens and governments
regarding public-law matters; ordinary courts that handle civil and criminal cases;
and IP courts. Our data regard civil law disputes (excluding those related to family
and inheritance issues, but including commercial issues) rendered by courts of first
and second instances within the ordinary courts, where there are 22 district courts
and 6 high courts. The Taiwan Supreme Court only reviews questions of law; our
data do not include its decisions. 7
As is typical for a civil-law system, there is no sharp distinction between pre-trial
and trial phases litigation; the entire lawsuit could be considered the “trial.” The
public trial is not intensive. Rather, judges and attorneys meet once every few weeks

For empirical studies of case selection by the Taiwan Supreme Court, see Eisenberg and
Huang (2012).
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for a few times.
There is no American-style discovery in Taiwan, although there are rules for
disclosure of information early in the process. The Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure
was reformed in 2000 to have two stages of hearings, and any evidence not presented
at the first, preliminary stage hearing could be precluded in the second stage of
hearings (Huang 2009: 251–54). This has the effect of making evidence disclosure in
Taiwan something roughly equivalent to Rule 26(a) disclosures under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; i.e., the parties must disclose documents and materials that
they intend to submit as evidence to the court. Anecdotally, however, Taiwanese
judges tell us that they often allow evidence in the second stage of hearings when
there is a good reason. No one has studied empirically how often judges have exerted
their power to preclude new evidence and to what extent parties and their
representatives have been incentivized to present evidence in the preliminary stage.
Attorneys we interviewed corroborate the stories told by the judges, as they still tried
to refrain from presenting evidence unless they have to. That is, the “not showing
your hand until you have to” strategy described by Huang (2009: 252) appears to be
still popular today.
Most attorneys charge flat fees, collected beforehand. Contingent fees are legal
but are used in less than 5% of the cases (Chang and Tu 2018). Bigger law firms
charge by the hour about half of the time (Chang and Tu 2018). Most attorneys
charge 1,500 USD to 2,500 USD per case, per court instance (i.e., appeal is a separate
fee). 8
There are three types of court procedures: small-claim procedure, summary
procedure, and ordinary procedure. Small-claim procedures apply when the amount
at stake is below 100,000 NTD (approximately 3,333 USD). Small-claim cases are
handled by a single judge in one of the 22 district courts. The median time between
filing and termination for cases ended in adjudication is 50 days. This kind of case
can be appealed to a three-judge district court panel on questions of law.
Summary procedures apply when the amount at stakes is below 500,000 NTD
(approximately 16,666 USD) or in certain types of cases specified in Article 427 of
Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure. This type of cases is also handled by a single judge.
The median time between filing and termination for cases ended in adjudication is 58
days. Cases can be appealed to a three-judge district court panel for trial de novo, and

8

Original research; data on file with authors.
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the court may permit appeal to Supreme Court.
A case applying ordinary procedures is handled by a single judge in the district
court. The median time between filing and termination for cases ended in
adjudication is 166 days. 9 Appeals are handled by a three-judge panel in one of the
six high courts. The review of facts and laws is de novo. Cases with more than
1,000,000 NTD (approximately 33,333 USD) at stake may be appealed to the
Supreme Court for questions of laws. Appellants have to be represented by attorneys
in the Supreme Court. The Taiwan Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction
(Eisenberg and Huang 2012).
Settlement, at least its Chinese term in Taiwan law, can occur many ways.
Parties can settle out of court after filing a lawsuit. If they prefer to keep the
settlement terms strictly confidential, plaintiffs can withdraw their cases. Hence,
“withdrawal” as a case outcome can represent settlement. Of course, plaintiffs may
withdraw when finding out that they (at the time) do not have a winning case.
Parties can also settle before the judge assigned to handle their case. Judges, in fact,
are encouraged by the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure to actively promote settlement.
There is also mediation. During the mediation procedure, the dispute is first assigned
to a mediator (or multiple ones) chosen by the judge (parties may object to the choice;
mediators are chosen from a list of mediators prepared by each district court), and a
judge in the summary court or the original judge who handled the dispute will step in
at the final stage. Judges may also administer the mediation themselves throughout.
Either party is free to reject any mediation proposal by mediators. We treat all of
these forms of dispute resolution as “settlements” for our purposes. All of them
contrast with a judicial judgment in which the court renders a verdict that declares a
winner and awards (or declines to award) damages or issues injunctions.
The filing fee is pro rata (about 1% of the amount claimed in the first instance and
1.5% of the amount claimed in the second instance), meaning the higher the stakes,
the more expensive (in absolute terms) it is to use litigation to resolve the dispute.
Filing fees are two-thirds refunded if parties settle (including through mediation) in
court before adjudication. Filing fees have to be paid in full by plaintiffs before any
court procedure starts. If plaintiff wins partially, filing fees are allocated on pro rata
basis between the parties. If plaintiffs win entirely, filing fees are the sole

As a point of comparison, in the US federal courts, civil cases on average last approximately
326 days (median duration is 230). Authors’ calculations for all U.S. district courts, civil cases
filed 1999–2004 (data on file with authors).
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responsibility of defendants. Nonetheless, filing fees are not refunded to plaintiffs by
the court. Rather, a plaintiff enforces the award of filing fees against the defendant.
IV. Data and Summary Statistics
Our data are administrative data on the Taiwan courts collected by the Judicial
Yuan of Taiwan and made available to us for research purposes. The Judicial Yuan of
Taiwan is the administrative organ for judicial matters. It is independent of all courts,
including the Supreme Court, and is responsible for making judicial policies and
supervising the day-to-day operations of all courts. The Constitutional Court of
Taiwan is part of the Judicial Yuan, and the Chief Justice is the President of the
Judicial Yuan. All but one variable in the raw data were provided to one of us (Chang)
by the Judicial Yuan based on a codebook designed by Chang.
One key variable, case types (nature of disputes such as contract, torts, property,
etc.), was not contained in the raw data, but the administrative data included
information that we used to construct case types. Each civil case filed in Taiwan is
accompanied with a one-incomplete-sentence description of the nature of the
plaintiff’s claims, written by the clerks working in the filing office in each district
court. Norms and conventions—and the similar nature of many disputes—result in
frequent uses of several template descriptions. We used these descriptions as the
major source of information for case types. The Judicial Yuan of Taiwan also assigns
certain types of cases (such as maritime, international trade, medical malpractice,
labor, consumer, state liability, etc.) to separate tracks. These tracks serve two
functions: first, some of these cases will be handled solely by a specialized division
within a court. Second, some cases, such as medical malpractice cases and financial
cases, are expected to be more complicated than other ordinary cases. While cases
have been randomly assigned to judges, judges are still concerned that misfortune
will result in one judge being assigned all the knotty cases. Thus, random
assignments are conducted within each track, so that judges’ case burdens are more
likely to be even. The track of a case is indicated in the case name. We used it to
construct case types as well.
The original dataset includes 798,801 cases, each of which appears as a single
observation in the data. For our analyses below, we excluded cases/observations in
which the central or a local government is a party, remanded cases, cases coded as
disputes arising after defective settlement or mediation agreements, and cases in
which the number of plaintiffs or defendants was erroneously coded as 0. We also
15
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exclude cases in which the parties did not litigate over a monetarily quantifiable
claim. We then trimmed observations in the first and last percentiles of stakes, to
minimize undue effects from extreme outliers, and we removed cases with more than
one party in either side (for which patterns of settlements and verdicts may be
complex and poorly documented in the data). And because the plaintiff win rate is
one of the key outcome variables, we omitted cases in which defendants
counter-claimed. 10 This left about 500,000 cases in our data that we used for the
analysis below.
The data contain information on case outcomes, separating the outcomes of
“plaintiff win” (plaintiff obtains all requested relief) and “partial win” (plaintiff
obtains relief but less than the total amount claimed). In our regression analysis, we
follow the prior literature and treat both of these categories as victories for the
plaintiff. Thus, we recode “partial win” as “plaintiff win.” 11 In Appendix C, we treat a
partial win as “half a win,” based on the notion that a partial win may reflect the type
of close case that the PK hypothesis would predict goes to trial. 12 All results, except
where specifically noted below, are the same in terms of sign and statistical
significance.
Tables 1–3 provide summary statistics on our data. As Table 1 indicates, most
cases are resolved quickly and involve modest stakes. (The mean stakes of about

In Appendix B, we report regression models that include cases with counter claims and
those with multiple parties.
11 In the prior literature, an outcomes is usually coded as a plaintiff win if plaintiff received
any benefit at trial or appeal (Kessler, Meites, and Miller 1996: 243; Eisenberg and Farber
1997: S100), and most prior articles, except Klerman (2012) and Huang (2009), did not
distinguish between plaintiff partial wins and plaintiff full wins. The Japanese
administrative data used in Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989: 283) and the American
administrative data used in other articles do not distinguish between full and partial wins by
the plaintiffs.
12 Note that a partial win can arise in two ways. The first way is that the plaintiff could
prevail on one claim and lose on a second claim. For purposes of testing the PK model, this
could be coded as “0.5,” because the plaintiff is winning 50% of the time. But the second, and
we suspect more prevalent way that a partial win arises is when the plaintiff prevails but
receives less than the full amount demanded. For example, if a plaintiff claims for, say, 100
dollars as damages, then the Judicial Yuan of Taiwan defines as a partial win any court award
between 1 cent and 99.99 dollars. Only 100 dollars is a full win, and only a 0 dollar award is a
full loss. (An entirely different approach would be to extend the PK model to allow for partial
wins, which would occur for cases with case strength below the threshold for a win, but above
a second, somewhat lower threshold. See Klerman (2012). Because this approach would be
applicable for the former scenario above—winning on one claim and losing on another
claim—but not the latter scenario above—a plaintiff winning on the claim but receiving less
than the full amount demanded, we do not explore this option further.)
10
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840,000 NTD is equivalent to approximately USD 28,000; the median of about
168,000 NTD is equivalent to about USD 5,600.) Stakes represent the amount
claimed, which is usually the damages demanded by the plaintiff. Note that because
filing fees are a positive function of the plaintiff ’s ad damnum, the plaintiff ’s claimed
stakes do not represent “cheap talk” and thus constitute a more credible measure of
stakes. 13
Three facts jump out from Table 2. First, very few litigants are
represented—about 26 percent of plaintiffs and 22 percent of defendants. Note
however, that a business represented by in-house, rather than retained, counsel will
be coded as unrepresented in this data, so this measure is somewhat noisy. (If
corporate parties are excluded, 28 percent of plaintiffs and 21 percent of defendants
are represented.) Second, most plaintiffs, but a minority of defendants, are
corporations. This reflects the fact than many lawsuits involve debt collection efforts
by corporations against individuals. 14 Third, most filed lawsuits are litigated to a
court judgment rather than ending in settlement. In this paper, we treat several
outcome categories in the data as “settlement”: these include judge-approved
settlement, judge-administered successful mediation, and plaintiff or appellant
withdrawal. As noted in the previous part, we treat successful mediation and
judge-approved settlement as settlement in the sense envisaged by literature on
litigation versus settlement. Some unknown fraction of cases coded as ending in
“withdrawals” involve private settlements. In this article, we follow Huang (2009:
256–257) and include all cases coded as ending in plaintiff or appellant withdrawal
as “settled.” In every withdrawal, the plaintiff voluntarily gives up the possibility of a
court verdict, and, as soon as defendants plead their defense on the merits, plaintiffs
can only withdraw if defendants agree. Thus, even if no money changes hands, this
outcome is, to our eyes, fairly characterized as settlement.

In contrast, US court data rarely has reliable information on stakes. Most states do not
require the complaint to specify a damages amount (although plaintiffs often do), and the
federal courts require only an allegation that stakes exceed USD 75,000 in cases based on
diversity jurisdiction, which make up about one quarter of the federal civil docket. Thus, cases
with damages specified in the complaint are a selected subsample of all cases. Further,
because filing fees do not depend on the amount claimed in federal court (and in many state
courts), incentives to accurately quantify stakes tend to be weaker for US cases.
14 In 2015, for instance, official Judicial Statistics Yearbook indicates that 51,163 of the
116,601 non-commercial private-law filed cases (44%) are monetary loan cases. In 39,334 of
the filed cases (77%), courts reached a substantive decision and ruled for plaintiffs in full in
35,507 of them (90%). The 90% plaintiff win rate is substantially higher than that in other
types of cases.
13
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Table 2 drives home the relative rarity of settlement in Taiwan. We see
settlements in less than a quarter of all cases. 15 This is far less than in the U.S.,
where settlement rates in federal court tend to exceed 60% (Hadfield 2004; Eisenberg
and Lanvers 2009: 143).
Judgment outcomes after trial in Taiwan also differ from the corresponding
patterns in the US. We also see that plaintiffs in Taiwan (like those in Japan, see
Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989)) win more than 50% of the time at trial. This is in
contrast to the U.S., where various empirical articles have found that, at least for
many categories of cases, plaintiffs win less than 50% at trial (Kessler, Meites, and
Miller 1996: 236). Finally, Table 3 provides the distribution of the cases in our data
across levels of the court system and across geographic regions.
One important terminology note: Our data include courts of first and second
instance. To avoid cluttering in writing, “plaintiffs” refer to both “plaintiffs” in the
court of first instance and “appellants” in the court of second instance.
V. Hypotheses and Results
In this section, we identify a set of hypotheses that we draw from the literature
and then test them in our data. These hypotheses allow us to test predictions of the
original Priest and Klein (1984) model, extensions to the model that introduce risk
aversion, and competing, canonical models based on one-sided asymmetric
information.
In this section, we initially organize our discussion around the two types of
empirical tests implicated by the hypotheses: first, identifying factors that predict the
settlement rate; second, identifying factors associated with plaintiff win rates closer
to 50%. After conducting these tests, we then reorganize our results: we sort them
based on which theories or models of litigation they shed light on. This allows us to
make progress is assessing the empirical relevance of canonical models of suit and
settlement. (To preview, these results are summarized in Table 8, which we’ll discuss
in greater detail at the end of this section.)

The high trial rates and low settlement rates were about at the same levels in 1996–2006
(Huang 2009: 262–263).
15
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A. Hypotheses
1. Hypotheses related to rate of trial and settlement
We have identified a pair of testable predictions about the determinants of the
rate of trial and the rate of settlement. The canonical LPG divergent expectations
model predicts that higher stakes make trial more likely. To be more precise, as
stakes rise relative to the cost of litigating, small differences in the parties’ beliefs
about their likelihood of winning are more likely to render the defendant’s settlement
willingness to pay less than the plaintiff ’s willingness to accept. To the contrary is the
view that risk-averse parties will tend to settle rather than litigating when stakes
are high. This latter view does not reject the LPG wholesale, but rather hypothesizes
that risk aversion will outweigh the effect of mutual optimism on the relationship
between stakes and settlement. Thus, we state our first hypothesis in the alternative:
H1(a): Higher stakes will be associated with lower settlement rates.
H1(b): Higher stakes will be associated with higher settlement rates.
We note that it is possible that both effects will be empirically relevant, and for some
levels of stakes, one effect may dominate the other.
2. Hypotheses related to the 50% prediction from the PK model
We have identified three testable predictions about the tendency of plaintiff win
rates to approach or diverge from 50%.
First, in the spirit of Waldfogel’s (1995; 1998) conceptual approach, we
hypothesize that when comparing courts and case types, those with lower trial rates
will have plaintiff win rates closer to 50%. We also note the contrary prediction from
AI models, that lower trial rates will tend to be associated with plaintiff win rates
closer to 0% or 100% (see supra Part II). This gives us our second hypothesis, stated
in the alternative:
H2(a): When divided by court and nature of suit type, categories of
cases with higher settlement rates will have plaintiff win rates closer
to 50%.
H2(b): When divided by court and nature of suit type, categories of
cases with higher settlement rates will have plaintiff win rates farther
from 50%.
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Second, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999: 114) argue that information asymmetry
is less likely to be a major factor in contract, trademark, and labor cases, since
relevant actions by defendants are observable by both parties. By contrast, in the
absence of discovery (which is not available in Taiwan), tort defendants know the
amount of care they took, while plaintiffs do not. This suggests that the Priest-Klein
prediction should be stronger in contract, trademark, and labor cases than in tort
cases. As a consequence, plaintiff win rates in contract cases should be closer to 50%
than those in tort cases. This argument gives us our third hypothesis:
H3: Plaintiff win rates will be closer to 50% in contract cases than in
tort cases.
Finally, as noted above, Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996: 246) argue that high
stakes cases will involve more settlement, as risk aversion will push the parties
towards settlement when stakes are higher. This implies that in high stakes cases,
win rates of plaintiffs should be closer to 50%, as compared to low-stake cases. This
gives us our fourth and last hypothesis:
H4: Plaintiff win rates will approach 50% as stakes rise.

B. Results
In this section, we present our regression results, accompanied by graphical
illustrations, that we use to assess how these hypotheses fare in the data.
1. Hypotheses related to rate of trial and settlement
Table 4 presents a series of regressions that test our first pair of hypotheses. We
use linear probability models (i.e., OLS) with robust standard errors clustered by
court regions. The key variables of interest are stakes (log transformed) and party
identity (corporation or individual). Also included in the regressions is a standard set
of fixed effects that we use for all of the regressions in this paper: 3 types of
proceedings (small-claim, summary, and ordinary); 2 court levels (first instance and
second instance, i.e., appeal); 12 case types, 7 court regions, and 18 years of case
filing (1998–2015). 16

In unreported results, we have re-run all regressions for first-instance courts only.
Unsurprisingly, given that second-instance court represent less than 10% of the sample, all
qualitative results are identical, and point estimates and p-values change very little. We have
16
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Panel A of Table 4 includes cases with the full range of stakes, while Panel B
incudes only high-stakes cases arguably comparable to US federal-court cases, which
tend to involve far higher stakes than the typical case in Taiwan (or in US state
court). Here, we limit our sample to cases with stakes in excess of USD 75,000, which
corresponds to the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction cases
in US federal court. 17
Specifications across columns vary the inclusion of covariates and the inclusion of
loan contract and debt payment cases (hereinafter debt collection cases). Debt
collection cases represent a disproportionate share of all cases, and we have a priori
reasons to doubt that prevailing theories of suit and settlement apply to them: most
of these actions involve efforts to collect on unpaid debts (most often, unpaid credit
card debts) in which there is little or no uncertainty or asymmetric information about
the existence of the debt or the amount due. Further, unlike other types of litigation,
which tends to involve individual plaintiffs, debt collection cases overwhelmingly
involve corporate plaintiffs suing individual defendants. 18 Finally, based on statistics
from the Judicial Yuan on “money borrowing” cases, a category that corresponds to
what we have labeled “debt collection” cases, roughly 70% of money borrowing cases
end with default judgments, whereas only about 17% of other types of cases ended
this way. 19 Of the money borrowing cases, fully 95% of them were decided 100% in
favor of the plaintiff. For these reasons, we consider our results excluding debt
collection cases to be our preferred specifications for regressions, and our figures also
exclude these cases. Nonetheless, we note that the results are not particularly
sensitive to this choice. 20
Our results here provide some support for the basic LPG prediction, but not the

also tested the robustness of our results to our exclusion of cases with counterclaims or
multiple parties. These exclusions reduced our sample size from about 620,000 to about
450,000 observations. Nonetheless, all results herein are robust to this change in specification,
with virtually no changes in statistical significance levels or overall magnitudes (in fact, many
results are stronger). See Appendix B.
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We use an exchange rate of 30 NTD to 1 USD, which is (rounded to
the nearest NTD), current as of January 3, 2018.
18 In our data, 86% of the debt collection cases involve corporate plaintiffs suing
natural-person defendants, while only 22% of other cases do.
19 We acquired the default judgment statistics from the Statistics Department of the Judicial
Yuan. Both we and the Department use the same raw data to combine cases into dispute
types. We are confident that money borrowing cases as identified by the Department highly
overlapped with the debt collection cases defined by us.
20 Specifications including these cases are reported herein, and figures including these cases
are available from authors upon request.
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prediction that risk aversion will lead to higher settlement rates as stakes rise. The
relationship between stakes and settlement appears to be negative. We illustrate in
Figure 1, which groups cases by their stakes, and then shows, for each range of
stakes, the average settlement rate among those cases. As Figure 1 makes
remarkably clear, within each proceeding type (small, summary, and ordinary
procedure), settlement rates fall as stakes rise. 21 Recall that the LPG model predicts
that settlement rates fall as stakes rise as compared to costs. Stakes in Figure 1 rise
steadily as one moves left-to-right, while, within each proceeding type, costs remain
roughly constant (recall that most attorneys charge a flat, fixed fee, with rates keyed
to the proceeding type and court instance), but costs rise discretely as one moves from
small to summary, or summary to ordinary, proceedings.
More specifically, in the summary and small-claim procedures, plaintiffs are
allowed to make oral claims. Essentially, plaintiffs can externalize the costs of
formulating their claims formally to the court; therefore, they do not need to hire
attorneys. By contrast, for plaintiffs in the ordinary procedure, written claims are
required. In addition, in the summary and small-claim procedures, in principle,
parties will meet only once for trials. If one party fails to show up, judges have
discretion to issue default judgments. By contrast, in the ordinary procedure, there is
no limit on trial days, and the use of default judgments is more constrained. These
differences again ensure that the summary and small-claim procedures are less
costly than the ordinary procedure for parties. Furthermore, the small-claim
procedure is even less costly than the summary procedure, because in the former,
plaintiffs may use a tabular form to make their claims; trials may be conducted in the
evening or in weekends; and under certain circumstances, judges may skip evidence
investigation and act more like arbitrators.
In the regression results, the overall relationship between stakes and settlement
is fairly consistently negative across specifications. In most specifications, especially
among higher-stakes cases, the negative relationship is statistically significant (at
the 1% level) and consistent in magnitude. 22 Thus, we consider H1(a) supported by

Unreported graphs show that the same pattern (settlement rates decreasing within
proceedings) holds in all 7 court regions.
22 Because risk aversion may affect individuals more so than corporations, we re-run these
results including only cases between individuals. See Table B2. Our results hold even for this
subset of the data. In our robustness check including counterclaim cases and multiple party
cases, the results are even more consistently negative and statistically significant. See Table
B1.
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the regression results. Conversely, we do not find support for Hypothesis 1(b) in the
data.
2. Hypotheses related to the 50% prediction of the PK Model
We now test our hypotheses related to the famous 50% prediction of the PK model
and competing hypotheses generated by other theoretical approaches.
We set out to test H2 by dividing our data into groups. Many grouping are
possible; for consistency, we create groups using the categories that served as controls
throughout the paper. 23 We divide all our cases into bins based on court procedure
(three procedures), appellate level (first and second instance), court (7 regions), and
case category (12 subject-matter categories). This yields 504 bins (some of which may
be empty in the data), each of which contains all cases with a unique combination of
procedure, level, court, and case type. Within each bin, we computed the settlement
rates and plaintiff win rates. Settlement rates are the number of settlements divided
by the number of filed cases that were either settled or decided by judges. Plaintiff
win rates are the number of plaintiff wins divided by the number of court decisions
(i.e., non-settlements).
We hypothesized (H2(a)) that plaintiff win rates will approach 50% as settlement
rates rise. To test this graphically, we plotted settlement rates against win rates. In
Figure 2, each circle represents one bin, with the size of the circle proportional to the
number of court decisions in the bin.
Given the low overall settlement rates in Taiwan compared to those in the US, it
is not surprising that even bins with relatively high settlement rates have a wide
range of plaintiff win rates. Nonetheless, Figure 2 reveals the predicted pattern: as
settlement rates increase, plaintiff win rates do, in fact, converge towards 50%. We
must remark that these qualitative results reveal a pattern quite similar to the
graphical results that Waldfogel (1995) finds with US data.
Regression analysis supports these qualitative conclusions. Table 5 reports
results of regressions where each observation corresponds to a bin defined by the
same set of controls used for other regressions: procedure, level, court, case type, and

In our figures, we group cases by court procedure, court level, court region, and case
category (all of which correspond to the fixed effects we include in our regressions), but for
graphical clarity, we do not also group by filing year (which we do include as fixed effects in
our regressions). This would multiply the number of possible categories by a factor of 18,
making most individual observations impossible to distinguish in a scatterplot.
23
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filing year. The outcome variable for the regression is the absolute difference between
the plaintiff win rate for that observation and 0.50. As the settlement rate rises, H2(a)
predicts that plaintiff win rates will converge to 0.50, and thus we predict a negative
relationship between settlement rates and the outcome variable. This is what we find,
at least for regressions including all levels of stakes. For high stakes cases, we have a
null result. 24 We interpret this as some support for H2(a): the famous Priest-Klein
50% hypothesis. Conversely, this evidence tends to reject H2(b), the prediction based
on asymmetric-information, rather than divergent-expectation, models.
We apply a similar approach to test H3, that plaintiff win rates will be closer to
50% in contract, trademark, and labor cases (where one might conjecture that
asymmetric information is less) than in tort cases (where one might conjecture that
asymmetric information is greater). Notably, these assumptions seem more plausible
in the Taiwanese context than the US context, because limited discovery in Taiwan
means that asymmetries of information can persist throughout the litigation process,
unlike in the US, where broad discovery makes claims about the strong impact of
asymmetric information in the decision to go to trial much less plausible. Figure 3
employs the same strategy as Figure 2, except that it additionally distinguishes cases
categorized as tort from those categorized as contract. Figure 3, to our eyes, is hard to
interpret. Table 6 reports regression results, and here we see relationships consistent
with the hypothesis that tort cases (our proxy for AI cases) have plaintiff win rates
farther from 50%. Our inference from these results, however, is qualified by the fact
that these results—unlike our other results—are not robust to changes in the
definition of plaintiff win. In fact, if we treat partial wins as half-wins, the results flip
(see Table C2, but compare Table B2, which is consistent with Table 6). Thus, we
treat these results as inconclusive, or perhaps offering H3 some support.
Finally, we test H4, that the plaintiff win rate will approach 50% as stakes rise.
This hypothesis is derivative of H1(b), which we have rejected. In Figure 4, as in
Figure 1, we divide the data by stakes into groups. In each group, we separate out the
first-instance and the second-instance (appellate) cases, and then compute the
plaintiff win rate for each group. As Figure 4 makes clear, plaintiff win rates
converge to 50% as stakes rise.
Figure 5 replicates Figure 2, except that the horizontal axis now measures the
average (logged) stakes in each bin, rather than the settlement rate. Here, too, we see

Note that the findings remain qualitatively similar in our robustness checks. See Tables B4
and C1.
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clear convergence towards 50% win rates as stakes rise.
Table 7 provides regression results. Although not all specifications yield
statistically significant results, all of them predict that plaintiff win rates will
approach 50% as stakes rise. 25 This supports the conclusion that there is a negative
relationship between stakes and deviations from a 50% win rate. Taken together, this
evidence supports H4.
3. Summary of Results
Table 8 summarizes our findings in this paper. Rather than organizing the results
around the outcomes studies (as we did in the previous sections), here we organize
the hypotheses and results based on the models that were sources of the predictions.
In this way, our results allow us to evaluate these models empirically.
Viewed in this light, the PK model gains support. We see support for the
prediction of the LPG model (whose logic underlies the PK model) that higher stakes
will be associated with lower settlement rates (H1(a)). Most notably, Priest and
Klein’s famous 50% prediction (H2(a)) holds up. We see a tendency toward 50% win
rates as settlement rates rise, even in data from a court system where the trial rate
never gets close to zero.
We see that the hypotheses based on canonical asymmetric information models
garnered less support. The competing prediction that selection will tend to drive win
rates away from 50% (H2(b)) is based on canonical models of litigation and
settlement under one-sided asymmetric information. This prediction is rejected by
the data. Hypothesis 3, which looked for evidence that cases with symmetric
information (contract rather than tort) exhibit patterns closer to the PK model fared
better, although the results were sensitive to how partial wins were coded. While not
a prediction of asymmetric information model, Hypothesis 3 nonetheless implied that
the PK model would have less empirical relevance in contexts with asymmetric
information. Our results here, however, are tentative at best.
Perhaps the most intriguing result is the very strong pattern that plaintiff win
rates approach 50% as stakes rise (H4). In the PK model, win rates approaching 50%
are correlated with higher settlement rates, and this is what we find in the data.
Further, in the PK model, higher stakes are correlated with lower settlement rates,
and this, too, is what we find in the data. If both of these are true, why then do we see
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in our data that higher stakes are correlated with win rates approaching 50%?
We cannot definitively answer this question with the data. One conjecture is that
the relationship between higher stakes and win rates closer to 50% is being driven
primarily by the negative relationship between stakes and win rates in first-instance
cases. (See the top series in Figure 4, and recall that over 90% of the sample is
first-instance cases.) This negative relationship, rather than being a puzzle, may
simply be yet more evidence in favor of the LPG model. 26 Here is why: in the LPG
model, a plaintiff files suit only if the expected value of the suit (stakes times
probability of winning) exceeds the cost of litigation. For low-stakes cases, this will
likely be the case only when likelihood of winning is high. For high-stakes cases,
expected value may exceed cost even if the plaintiff ’s chances of winning are low. This
logic predicts exactly the pattern we see in the top series in Figure 4.
This reasoning rationalizes nearly all of our results, but not quite all. The same
logic would predict that the lower series in Figure 4—win rates among cases brought
in second-instance courts—should also have the same negative relationship. After all,
the decision to appeal entails the same cost-benefit analysis as the decision to file in
the first instance. (And keep in mind that lawyers in Taiwan general charge
separately for appeals.) Thus, we are left with intriguing, but hardly conclusive,
explanations for the overall pattern of results in our data. Nonetheless, we see the
results as largely consistent with the predictions of the LPG and PK models.
VI. Conclusion
Using a new, comprehensive dataset of civil cases from Taiwan, we tested a series
of hypotheses reflecting the predictions of the PK model and the related literature.
Some hypotheses were strongly supported by the data, some were weakly supported,
and some hypotheses were rejected. Overall, though, we interpret our results as
largely finding support for the predictions of the PK model. We interpret our results
as less consistent with predictions based on canonical models of asymmetric
information.
These results augur favorably for the PK model and come at a time when the
theoretical literature on litigation and settlement, after years of focusing on models
of asymmetric information, is experiencing something of a “renaissance” for the PK
model (see, e.g., Klerman and Lee 2014; Gelbach 2016) and for symmetric
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information models more generally (see, e.g., Hubbard 2016). In contrast, predictions
based on AI models (H2(b) and H3) generate more mixed results. This does not
undermine the conceptual soundness of these models, but it does undercut their
empirical relevance to explaining broad patterns of court practice.
To be sure, these results are hardly conclusive, and they represent only a test of a
few implications in the context of one legal system. Before we can translate these
results into normative or prescriptive conclusions, further empirical testing and
model development is necessary.
Nonetheless, we emphasize two reasons to give weight to our results. First, they
reinforce the generally favorable overall results of earlier empirical studies on the PK
model, and do so using entirely new data in an entirely new context. 27 In this way,
our data amplify earlier findings because they provide a stronger test of the external
validity of the PK model than most prior studies, many of which have relied on
subsets of the same US federal court administrative data. Second, one would expect
the Taiwanese context to be especially favorable for AI models. In the US context,
broad pre-trial discovery imposes an environment of nearly symmetric information
upon the parties well in advance of trial. This gives one reason to doubt, a priori, the
empirical relevance of models whose central feature is one-sided information
asymmetry. In contrast, the much more limited requirements of disclosure in
Taiwanese litigation suggest an environment in which asymmetric information could
persist throughout most of the civil-law trial process. For this reason, too, our results
present a tougher, more informative test of the PK model.
Importantly, though, the limited support of the AI models tested here does not
reject asymmetric information models generally. Indeed, as noted earlier, the PK
model itself can be understood as a model of two-sided private information. Thus, one
implication of our results is that theoretical work on litigation may benefit from a
focus on less elegant, but perhaps more descriptively powerful, models based on
two-sided incomplete or private information.

We note that unlike the PK model, which has been aggressively challenged through
empirical tests, AI models of litigations have generated few testable empirical prediction and
even fewer empirical tests. Indeed, one drawback of many existing models is that they were
developed as tools for developing conceptual insights about the legal system, not as positive
theories of how the legal system works. Thus, these models are well suited as pedagogical
tools, but less suited as guides to practical policy. One of the challenges for theoretical work in
this area is to develop models that generate explicit, crisp empirical predictions that can be
tested. Models that succeed at better describing reality should have greater weight in
policy-relevant analysis.
27
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We believe these results contribute the growing literature that seeks to identify
the empirical implications of influential theories and then test those predictions
against data. And we believe that empirical tests of theories of litigation versus
settlement with non-U.S. data may serve as especially rigorous tests of the
predictions of theories developed in the context of the US legal system.
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Tables
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS, CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Variable

Mean

Stakes (000s NTD)

Median

Max

Min

N

843.8

168.5

33,950

6.57

476,709

Year Filed

2012.3

2012

2015

1998

473,229

Year Terminated

2012.5

2013

2015

2010

476,709

97.04

58

5167

0

476,709

Case Duration (Days)

TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS, DUMMY VARIABLES
Variable

Mean

Any Party Appeals

0.10

Corporate Plaintiff/Appellant

0.63

Corporate Defendant/Appellee

0.13

Represented Plaintiff/Appellant

0.26

Represented Defendant/Appellee

0.22

Outcomes

N=476,709

N=476,709

Settled

0.24

Plaintiff/Appellant Win

0.53

Plaintiff/Appellant Partial Win

0.12

Plaintiff/Appellant Loss

0.11

Note. Outcomes (including “procedural dismissal”, “transfer jurisdiction”, and
some other procedural management) not reflecting settlement or a judgment
on the merits are excluded from this table.
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS, COURT VARIABLES
Variable

Mean

Court Procedure and Level

N
476,709

Small Claim, 1st Instance

0.34

Small Claim, 2d Instance

0.004

Summary Procedure, 1st Instance

0.39

Summary Procedure, 2d Instance

0.03

Ordinary Procedure, 1st Instance

0.19

Ordinary Procedure, 2d Instance

0.05

Court Region

476,709

Taipei

0.35

North

0.26

Central

0.16

South: Tainan

0.09

South: Kaohsiung

0.13

East

0.02

Island

0.002
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TABLE 4. PREDICTORS OF SETTLEMENT RATE

Panel A. All Stakes
Ln Stakes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.011

–0.013

–0.015**

–0.015**

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.002)

(0.003)

Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes

N

(0.010)

(0.010)

0.023*

0.001

(0.009)

(0.004)

Y

453,045

453,045

214,973

214,973

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.019**

–0.019**

–0.020**

–0.021**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Corporate Defendant

cases

–0.013

Y

Corporate Plaintiff

Include “debt collection”

–0.047**

–0.008

0.019

(0.006)

(0.008)

0.003

–0.007

(0.007)

(0.008)

Y

Y

34,115

34,115

29,558

29,558

Note. High stakes cases are cases with stakes exceeding USD 75,000. All
columns include fixed effects for procedure, level, case type, court, and filing
year. Linear regressions including cases with one plaintiff against one
defendant. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on court region.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION OF
PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%
Variable
Settlement Rate
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.220**

–0.115**

0.037

0.035

(0.016)

(0.020)

(0.032)

(0.033)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

2,893

2,360

Y

Y

1,204

1,022

Note. High stakes cases are cases with stakes exceeding USD 75,000. Outcome
variable is the absolute value of the difference between the plaintiff win rate and 0.5.
Each observation includes the average settlement rate and the absolute deviation
from 0.5 of the average plaintiff win rate for a category of cases. Observations
(categories) weighted by number of court decisions within the category. Categories
are defined by court, procedure, level, and case type. All columns include fixed effects
for procedure, level, case type, court, and filing year. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE 6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE CATEGORY (PROXY FOR AI) AND ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%
Variable
Tort (Asymmetric Info)
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.035**

0.036**

0.086**

0.090**

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.010)

(0.010)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

1,896

1,363

Y

Y

799

617

Note. High stakes cases are cases with stakes exceeding USD 75,000. Outcome
variable is the absolute value of the difference between the plaintiff win rate and 0.5.
Each observation includes an indicator for a proxy of asymmetric information (tort
cases as opposed to contract, trademark, and labor cases), the average settlement
rate and the absolute deviation from 0.5 of the average plaintiff win rate for a
category of cases. Observations (categories) weighted by number of cases within the
category. Categories are defined by court, procedure, level, and case type. Settled
cases and cases other than tort, contract, trademark, and labor excluded. All columns
include fixed effects for procedure, level, case type, court, and filing year. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF
WIN RATES FROM 50%
Variable
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection” case
type categories

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.096**

–0.016**

–0.002

–0.008

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.017)

(0.018)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

2,893

2,360

Y

Y

1,204

1,022

Note. High stakes cases are cases with stakes exceeding USD 75,000. Outcome
variable is the absolute value of the difference between the plaintiff win rate and 0.5.
Each observation includes average log stakes, the average settlement rate and the
absolute deviation from 0.5 of the average plaintiff win rate for a category of cases.
Observations (categories) weighted by number of cases within the category.
Categories are defined by court, procedure, level, and case type. Settled cases
excluded. All columns include fixed effects for procedure, level, case type, court, and
filing year. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE 8. REVIEW OF RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Model

Hypothesis
H1(a): Higher stakes ↔ lower
settlement rates

PK Model

Result
Some Support

H2(a): Higher settlement rates
↔ plaintiff win rates closer to

Some Support

50%
H2(b): Higher settlement rates
↔ plaintiff win rates farther
Competing Model: AI

Rejected

from 50%
H3: Contract (compared to tort)
cases ↔ plaintiff win rates closer

Some Support

to 50%
H1(b): Higher stakes ↔ higher
Competing Model:

settlement rates

Risk Aversion

H4: Higher stakes ↔ plaintiff
win rates closer to 50%
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Figures

FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT AND STAKES

Note. Binned scatterplot representing the average log stakes and settlement for 30
quantiles of stakes. Vertical lines indicate the cutoffs for eligibility for summary
procedure (NTD 100,000; logged value 11.5) and for ordinary procedure (NTD
500,000; logged value 13.2). All figures exclude loan contract and debt collection
cases.
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FIGURE 2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATE AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, BY
PROCEDURE, LEVEL, COURT, AND CASE CATEGORIES

Note. Scatterplot of 422 observations of the settlement rate and plaintiff win rate
among cases within the procedure/level/case-category. Size of circle is proportional to
the number of court decisions represented by each observation.
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FIGURE 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATE AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,
COMPARING CONTRACT (LOW AI) AND TORT (HIGH AI) ACTIONS
BY REGION, PROCEDURE, LEVEL, AND CASE CATEGORIES

Note. Scatterplot of 204 observations of the settlement rate and plaintiff win rate
among cases with and without both parties represented, by region/procedure/level/
case-category. Size of circle is proportional to the number of court decisions
represented by each observation.
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FIGURE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,
BY STAKES AND COURT LEVEL

Note. Binned scatterplot representing the average log stakes and settlement for 30
quantiles of stakes. Within each quantile, averages for observations from first
instance courts are represented separately from averages for observations from
second instance courts.
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FIGURE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG STAKES AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, BY
REGION, PROCEDURE, LEVEL, END YEAR, AND CASE CATEGORIES

Note. Scatterplot of 414 observations of the settlement rate and plaintiff win rate
among cases within the procedure/level/case-category. Size of circle is proportional to
the number of cases represented by each observation.
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Appendix A: Additional Hypotheses Regarding Party Status and Attorney
Representation
In this Appendix, we present additional hypotheses grounded in the empirical
literature on litigation and settlement, but which do not bear directly on testing the
PK model or the canonical AI models. These additional hypotheses explore the
empirical relationships between party status (individual, corporation) or attorney
representation, on the one hand, and settlement rates or win rates, on the other
hand.

A. Hypotheses
1. Hypotheses related to rate of trial and settlement
First, Eisenberg and Farber (1997: S93) argue that because plaintiffs are drawn
from individuals with the highest tastes for litigation (or, equivalently, the lowest
psychological cost of litigation), conditional on the expected value of claim, individual
plaintiffs, as compared to corporate plaintiffs, have higher trial rates and lower win
rates. Like H2, this prediction reflects an extension of the PK model to incorporate an
additional behavioral assumption—in this case, that individual plaintiffs have a
higher degree of optimism about their chances than corporate plaintiffs. This gives us
our hypothesis A1:
H(A1): Individual plaintiffs will have lower settlement rates than
corporate plaintiffs.
Second, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999: 114–116) posit that when both parties to
a suit are represented, they face lower legal uncertainty and thus are more likely to
reach a settlement. This is because, in the PK framework, legal uncertainty increases
the variance in the parties’ estimates of the plaintiff ’s probability of winning at trial,
which in turn makes it more likely that both parties will be optimistic about their
chances at trial. This gives us our hypothesis A2:
H(A2): Settlement rates will be higher when both parties are
represented than when at least one party is pro se.
We note, however, that testing this hypothesis in our data faces potentially
confounding factors. Unlike stakes and the individual or corporate status of the
parties, the presence of legal representation in the case is not exogenous to the
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dispute. Rather, the decision to hire attorneys is in some sense an outcome of a
dispute, in the same way that an agreement to settle is an outcome of a dispute—it is
something that is determined by the parties after the dispute arises. Thus, even if, in
a world where parties are randomly assigned lawyers, those with lawyers would be
more likely to settle, other factors may lead to an opposite correlation in our data. For
example, parties may only hire lawyers in cases that they perceive as “close” cases, or
only in cases where the parties see little hope for settlement. Further, the presence of
lawyers in a case is likely a strong proxy for the parties’ perceived stakes of the case.
If so, the presence of lawyers may be associated with less settlement, rather than
more.
2. Hypotheses related to which party has higher win rates
We have identified two testable predictions about the determinants of higher
plaintiff win rates for different categories of parties or claims.
First, we hypothesize that party representation will be associated with higher
win rates. The presence of lawyers could proxy for party stakes (parties with more to
lose are more likely to retain lawyers) or could proxy for party sophistication (see
Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996: 242–43) and Hylton (1993: 205))—or both. As a
consequence, this hypothesis is consistent with both the PK model and AI models
with one-sided asymmetric information.
To the extent that lawyers are a proxy for stakes, parties with lawyers will tend to
have higher win rate than unrepresented parties because those parties have higher
stakes, consistent with an extension to the PK model that adds the assumption that
lawyers proxy for stakes. As Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999: 109) and Eisenberg and
Farber (1997: S98) argue, parties with higher stakes will invest more in winning, and
thus will tend to have higher win rates. Hiring lawyers is an obvious investment in
this regard. In the same vein, Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996: 237–242) argue that
the party with the greater stakes is likely to win more often, as it has more to lose
from litigation and will offer enough to avoid a larger loss at trial. Thus, the litigated
cases are likely to be ones in which the party with the greater stakes is more likely to
win than would be the case when the stakes are equal.
To the extent that lawyers are a proxy for party sophistication, the presence of
lawyers on one side of a case indicates information asymmetry, and AI models
predicts that the party with the information advantage will win more than 50% of the
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time. 28 This is our hypothesis A3:
H(A3): Represented parties will have higher win rates than
unrepresented parties.
Second, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999: 109) and Eisenberg and Farber (1997:
S98) add the assumption that, on average, corporations have higher stakes in
litigation because, as repeat players, their stakes include not merely the damages
claimed, but reputational concerns as well. In contrast, they argue that individual
plaintiffs are more likely to be “one-shotters.” Corporations, however, may also be
more sophisticated parties, as noted above, and have the benefit of information
asymmetries. Thus, as with HA3, our prediction that corporations will tend to have
higher win rates in litigated cases is consistent with versions of both the PK and AI
models. This is our hypothesis A4:
H(A4): Corporations will have higher win rates than individuals.
3. Hypothesis related to the 50% prediction from the PK model
As noted earlier, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) argue that cases where both
sides are represented, as opposed to pro se, are more likely to settle. This yields the
corollary that plaintiff win rates should be closer to 50% when both sides are
represented than when at least one party is pro se. When both parties have
professionals on their side, they are more likely to bring only cases of high legal
uncertainty to trials. Pro se parties, on the other hand, may litigate over easy cases
with predictable outcomes (i.e., outcomes predictable only to lawyers) (Siegelman and
Waldfogel 1999: 114). This yields our hypothesis A5:
H(A5): Plaintiff win rates will be closer to 50% in cases where both
parties are represented than cases where at least one party is pro se.

We have set aside the most obvious potential reason for this claim, which is that lawyers
help one win. The empirical implications of this assumption are ambiguous; parties may only
seek a lawyer when they have a tough case, thereby attenuating the observed correlation
between represented parties and win rates. Further, retaining a lawyer could also change the
likelihood of settlement (as hypothesized above), such that the net effect of retaining a lawyer
depends on whether lawyers are more likely to settle strong cases or weak cases. Thus,
regardless of whether lawyers have a causal effect on the plaintiff win rate, the empirical
prediction depends crucially on the assumptions discussed above about the extent to which
the presence of lawyers proxies for factors relevant to models of the selection of disputes for
litigation or settlement.
28
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B. Results
In this section, we present our regression results, accompanied by graphical
illustrations, that we use to assess how these hypotheses fare in the data.
1. Hypotheses related to rate of trial and settlement
First, Tables 4 and Table A1 provide little evidence for HA1. Coefficients for
corporate plaintiff are mostly negative, implying that individual plaintiffs have
higher settlement rates, contrary to HA1, although most specifications yield no
statistically significant result for this hypothesis. Overall, we consider this to be a
null result, and conclude that Hypothesis A1 is unsupported by the data.
Second, the presence of lawyers on both sides of a lawsuit is consistently
associated with lower settlement rates. Across all specifications in Table A1, the
coefficient for “both parties represented” is large, negative, and statistically
significant. This counterintuitive result strongly rejects HA2. Importantly, this
hypothesis fairs equally poorly with high-stakes cases, for which one might otherwise
expect lawyers would be most necessary to bring parties to a meeting of the minds on
settlement. (These are also the cases most comparable to US federal court cases,
which is the context that gave rise to the hypothesis in the first place). Panel B of
Table A1 makes clear that this is not so.
Instead, this result may be driven by selection effects, i.e., parties only hire
lawyers when the cases is particularly close, high-stakes, or contentious—all factors
that make the case less likely to settle. In support of this view, Huang (2008: 217)
reviews Taiwanese court data from 2000–2006 and argues that “it is a party’s initial
decision to litigate the case that leads to him or her retaining counsel.”
2. Hypotheses related to which party has higher win rates
Table A2 presents a series of regressions that test our second set of hypotheses.
We again report linear probability model (i.e., OLS) regression results with fixed
effects. The dependent variable for these regressions is “plaintiff win.” As noted in
the main text, for our regressions, we recode partial wins as wins for the plaintiffs,
such that both “plaintiff win” (plaintiff obtains all requested relief) or “partial win”
(plaintiff obtains relief but less than the total amount claimed) are coded 1, and
“plaintiff loss” is coded as 0. In unreported results (available from authors), we treat
a partial win as “half a win,” based on the notion that a partial win may reflect the
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type of close case that the PK hypothesis would predict goes to trial. All results,
except where specifically noted below, are the same in terms of sign and statistical
significance.
These hypotheses fare better. First, HA3 predicts that represented parties will
have higher win rates than unrepresented parties. In Table A2, we see that plaintiffs
facing represented defendants have much lower win rates than plaintiffs facing
unrepresented defendants; the estimates for “represented defendant” are negative,
large in magnitude, and statistically significant. For represented plaintiffs, the
estimates for “represented plaintiff” are consistently positive, and sometimes
statistically significant. These results support HA3.
Second, we also see that corporations have higher win rates than individuals
across all specifications, regardless of whether the corporation is the plaintiff or the
defendant. These estimates are statistically significant, and all have the predicted
sign; corporate plaintiffs have higher win rates than individual plaintiffs, and
plaintiffs facing corporate defendants have lower win rates than plaintiffs facing
individual defendants. This pattern of results supports HA4, i.e., the prediction that
corporations (presumably the parties with greater sophistication and higher stakes)
will have higher win rates than individuals (presumably the parties with less
sophistication and lower stakes).
3. Hypothesis related to the 50% prediction of the PK Model
Finally, we test Hypothesis A5, that plaintiff win rates will be closer to 50% in
cases where both parties are represented, using a similar approach. We divide all
cases in groups to visualize the relationship between the settlement rate and the
plaintiff win rate, but this time distinguish between cases where both parties are
represented and those where they are not both represented. Figure A1 illustrates this
relationship when dividing cases into bins by procedure, level, court, and case type.
Circles represent bins where both parties are represented, and triangles represent
bins where one or both parties are pro se. (Thus, for each combination of court region,
procedure, appellate level, and case type, there are two bins: one for cases where both
parties are represented, and one for other cases.) Our hypothesis predicts that the
circles will tend to have plaintiff win rates closer to 50%; Figure A1 suggests this may
be true.
We then apply the same regression approach to HA5 that we applied to H2 in the
main text. Table A3 reports our results, and we find a consistently negative
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relationship between both parties being represented and the deviation of the plaintiff
win rate from 50%. In other words, the presence of lawyers is associated with win
rates closer to 50%. This is consistent with the picture drawn by Figure A1. The
strength of our inference from these results is tempered, however, by the fact that
these results are not robust to changes in the definition of plaintiff win; when partial
wins are counted as half-wins, the results are largely null. Thus, we conclude that
these results provide some, but not unqualified, support for HA5, which predicts that
litigated cases with represented parties will be a more highly selected, and “closer”
set of cases than litigated disputes involving unrepresented parties.
4. Summary of Results
The prediction that individual plaintiffs would have lower settlement rates (HA1)
was not supported. In other words, this data shows no patterns consistent with the
claim that individuals are systematically more litigious than corporations. Indeed,
one could have formed the opposite hypothesis, on the assumption that individuals
are more risk-averse than corporations, and thus more likely to settle—but there is
not much evidence for this, either.
Likewise, results based on theories about the role lawyers play are potentially
confounded by the fact that the presence of lawyers may proxy for the complexity,
value, or contentiousness of the dispute. This is likely why the results on lawyers
were mixed. The prediction that both parties being represented leads to higher
settlement rates (HA2) was rejected by the data, but the prediction that both parties
being represented leads to plaintiff win rates closer to 50% (HA5) had some support
in the data.
The remaining hypotheses were supported. To the extent that retaining a lawyer
(HA3) or having corporate status (HA4) proxies for a party having higher stakes, the
prediction of the PK model that the party with higher stakes will have a higher win
rate is supported. (Of course, it could simply be that retaining a lawyer is not merely
a proxy for stakes, but lawyers have a direct, causal impact on win rates!) We do not
count these results as weighing against AI models, however, as they generate
identical predictions in this context.
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Appendix A Tables and Figures
TABLE A1. PREDICTORS OF SETTLEMENT RATE, WITH ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION

Panel A. All Stakes

(1)

(2)

–0.004

–0.004

(0.006)

(0.003)

–0.037**

–0.009

(0.009)

(0.010)

Corporate

0.023*

0.006

Defendant

(0.007)

(0.005)

–0.170**

–0.191**

(0.008)

(0.003)

Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff

Both Represented
Include “debt

Y

collection” cases
N

453,045

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant
Both Represented
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

214,973

(1)

(2)

0.004

0.002

(0.003)

(0.003)

0.003

0.024*

(0.005)

(0.008)

0.013

–0.001

(0.008)

(0.009)

–0.241**

–0.243**

(0.007)

(0.007)

Y
34,115

Note. See Table 4.

47

29,558

Chang & Hubbard

Testing Litigation Selection Hypotheses
TABLE A2. PREDICTORS OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATE

Panel A. All Stakes
Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.013**

–0.010*

–0.008*

0.002

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.129**

0.134**

0.094**

0.097**

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.010)

(0.010)

–0.076**

–0.075**

–0.055**

–0.049**

(0.010)

(0.011)

(0.005)

(0.007)

Plaintiff Represented
Defendant Represented
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant

N

(0.012)

(0.006)

–0.127**

–0.180**

(0.011)

(0.001)

Y

348,390

348,390

142,991

142,991

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.007

0.011

–0.007

0.008

(0.008)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.008)

0.096**

0.090**

0.074**

0.079**

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.015)

–0.062**

–0.055**

–0.050**

–0.048*

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.013)

(0.014)

Defendant Represented

cases

0.030**

Y

Plaintiff Represented

Include “debt collection”

0.071**

0.002

0.017

(0.011)

(0.013)

–0.200**

–0.194**

(0.004)

(0.004)

Y

Y

28,378

28,378

20,174

20,174

Note. Cases in which courts did not give substantive verdicts (including those ending
in settlement) are omitted. All columns include fixed effects for procedure, level, case
type, court, and filing year. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered on
court region. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE A3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES REPRESENTED AND ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%
Variable
Ln Stakes
Both Parties Represented
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.106**

–0.012**

0.001

–0.002

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.012)

(0.013)

–0.005*

–0.092**

–0.135**

–0.123**

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

4,656

3,830

Y

Y

2,012

1,708

Note. High stakes cases are cases with stakes exceeding USD 75,000. Outcome
variable is the absolute value of the difference between the plaintiff win rate and 0.5.
Each observation includes an indicator for whether in all cases within the
observation/group both parties are represented by attorneys, the average settlement
rate and the absolute deviation from 0.5 of the average plaintiff win rate for a
category of cases. Observations (categories) weighted by number of court decisions
within the category. Categories are defined equivalently to Figure 3. Settled cases
excluded. All columns include fixed effects for procedure, level, case type, court, and
filing year. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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TABLE A4. REVIEW OF RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Model

Hypothesis

Result

H(A1): Individual
(non-corporate) plaintiffs ↔

Unsupported

lower settlement rates
Extension of PK:
Degree of Optimism

H(A2): Both parties represented
↔ higher settlement rates

Rejected

H(A5): Both parties represented
↔ plaintiff win rates closer to

Some Support

50%
Extension of PK:

H(A3): Represented parties ↔

Asymmetric Stakes

higher win rates

and/or

H(A4): Corporations, not

Competing Model: AI

individuals ↔ higher win rates
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FIGURE A1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATE AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,
COMPARING CASES WITH AND WITHOUT BOTH PARTIES REPRESENTED,
BY REGION, PROCEDURE, LEVEL, AND CASE CATEGORIES

Note. Scatterplot of 918 observations of the settlement rate and plaintiff win rate
among cases with and without both parties represented, by region/procedure/level/
case-category. Size of circle is proportional to the number of court decisions
represented by each observation.
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks: Regressions Including Cases with
Counterclaims and Multiple Parties

TABLE B1. PREDICTORS OF SETTLEMENT RATE, INCLUDING CASES WITH
COUNTERCLAIMS AND MULTIPLE PARTIES

Panel A. All Stakes
Ln Stakes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.015*

–0.016*

–0.018**

–0.018**

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.002)

Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes

N

(0.011)

(0.008)

0.011

–0.006

(0.005)

(0.004)

Y

618,917

618,917

340,046

340,046

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.015**

–0.015**

–0.015**

–0.015**

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.002)

Corporate Defendant

cases

0.027*

Y

Corporate Plaintiff

Include “debt collection”

–0.010

–0.001

0.016*

(0.004)

(0.006)

–0.014

–0.001

(0.009)

(0.009)

Y

Y

74,198

74,198

Note. See Table 4.
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TABLE B2. PREDICTORS OF SETTLEMENT RATE, INCLUDING ONLY CASES BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALS

Panel A. All Stakes
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

(1)

(2)

–0.013**

–0.013**

(0.003)

(0.003)

Y
132,793

116,061

(1)

(2)

–0.022**

–0.019*

(0.006)

(0.006)

Y
18,994

Note. See Table 4.
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TABLE B3. PREDICTORS OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, INCLUDING CASES WITH
COUNTERCLAIMS AND MULTIPLE PARTIES

Panel A. All Stakes
Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant

(1)

(2)

(4)

(5)

–0.006*

–0.003

–0.001

0.008**

(0.002)

(0.004)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.093**

0.099**

0.046*

0.049*

(0.016)

(0.017)

(0.015)

(0.015)

–0.045**

–0.045**

–0.037**

–0.030**

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.005)

(0.006)

Plaintiff Represented
Defendant Represented
Include “debt collection”
cases
N

Panel B. High Stakes
Ln Stakes
Corporate Plaintiff
Corporate Defendant

N

(0.011)

(0.004)

–0.146**

–0.186**

(0.011)

(0.002)

Y

461,931

461,931

225,960

225,960

(1)

(2)

(4)

(5)

–0.001

0.017**

–0.001

0.014*

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.006)

0.075**

0.064**

0.036

0.040

(0.016)

(0.015)

(0.017)

(0.017)

–0.020

–0.016

–0.038**

–0.030*

(0.009)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.011)

Defendant Represented

cases

0.054**

Y

Plaintiff Represented

Include “debt collection”

0.085**

0.003

0.031**

(0.006)

(0.007)

–0.203**

–0.195**

(0.004)

(0.003)

Y

Y

52,121

52,121

Note. See Table A2.
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TABLE B4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION
OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%, INCLUDING CASES WITH COUNTERCLAIMS AND

MULTIPLE PARTIES
Variable
Settlement Rate
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.241**

–0.152**

0.007

0.068

(0.016)

(0.021)

(0.034)

(0.035)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

3,088

2,540

Y

Y

1,409

1,203

Note. See Table 5.
TABLE B5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOTH PARTIES REPRESENTED AND ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%, INCLUDING CASES WITH
COUNTERCLAIMS AND MULTIPLE PARTIES
Variable
Ln Stakes
Both Parties Represented
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.097**

0.018**

0.029*

0.014

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.012)

(0.013)

–0.015**

–0.111**

–0.153**

–0.135**

(0.003)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

5,078

Note. See Table A3.
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4,208

Y

Y

2,402

2,056

Chang & Hubbard

Testing Litigation Selection Hypotheses

TABLE B6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE CATEGORY (PROXY FOR AI) AND ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%, INCLUDING CASES WITH
COUNTERCLAIMS AND MULTIPLE PARTIES
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.028**

0.027**

0.078**

0.079**

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.008)

(0.008)

Variable
Tort (Asymmetric Info)
Include “debt collection”

Y

cases

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

1,983

1,435

Y

Y

905

699

Note. See Table 6.
TABLE B7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF
WIN RATES FROM 50%, INCLUDING CASES WITH COUNTERCLAIMS AND MULTIPLE
PARTIES
Variable
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection” case
type categories

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.077**

0.026**

–0.001

0.003

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.018)

(0.019)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

3,088

Note. See Table 7.
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2,540

Y

Y

1,409

1,203
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TABLE B8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF
WIN RATES FROM 50%, INCLUDING ONLY CASES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
Variable
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection” case
type categories

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–0.013*

–0.013*

0.011

0.004

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.017)

(0.019)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

2,480

Note. See Table 7.
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2,018

Y

Y

1,003

840
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Appendix C: Robustness Checks: Regressions Treating Plaintiff Partial Win as Half a
Win

TABLE C1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION
OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%, TREATING PLAINTIFF PARTIAL WIN AS HALF A

WIN
Variable
Settlement Rate
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.389**

-0.180**

-0.019

-0.025

(0.018)

(0.023)

(0.028)

(0.029)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

2,893

Note. See Table 5.
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2,360

Y

Y

1,204

1,022
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TABLE C2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASE CATEGORY (PROXY FOR AI) AND ABSOLUTE
DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF WIN RATES FROM 50%, TREATING PLAINTIFF PARTIAL WIN AS
HALF A WIN
Variable
Tort (Asymmetric Info)
Include “debt collection”
cases

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.134**

-0.138**

-0.004

-0.002

(0.006)

(0.005)

(0.009)

(0.009)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

1,896

Note. See Table 6.
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1,363

Y

Y

799

617
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TABLE C3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND ABSOLUTE DEVIATION OF PLAINTIFF
WIN RATES FROM 50%, TREATING PLAINTIFF PARTIAL WIN AS HALF A WIN
Variable
Ln Stakes
Include “debt collection” case
type categories

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.103**

-0.074**

-0.014

-0.018

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.015)

(0.016)

Y

Y

High Stakes Cases Only
N

2,893

Note. See Table 7.
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2,360

Y

Y

1,204

1,022
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FIGURE C1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATE AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,
BY PROCEDURE, LEVEL, COURT, AND CASE CATEGORIES, TREATING PLAINTIFF PARTIAL

0

.2

Plaintiff Win Rate
.4
.6

.8

1

WIN AS HALF A WIN

0

.2

.4
.6
Settlement Rate

Note. See Figure 2.
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FIGURE C2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLEMENT RATE AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,
COMPARING CONTRACT (LOW AI) AND TORT (HIGH AI) ACTIONS
BY REGION, PROCEDURE, LEVEL, AND CASE CATEGORIES, TREATING PLAINTIFF

0

.2

Plaintiff Win Rate
.4
.6
.8

1

PARTIAL WIN AS HALF A WIN

0

.2

.6
.4
Settlement Rate

Contract Actions (excl. debt)

Note. See Figure 3.
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FIGURE C3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKES AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE,

0

.2

Plaintiff Win Rate
.4
.6

.8

1

BY STAKES AND COURT LEVEL, TREATING PLAINTIFF PARTIAL WIN AS HALF A WIN

8

10

12
Average Ln Stakes

Note. See Figure 4.
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FIGURE C4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOG STAKES AND PLAINTIFF WIN RATE, BY
REGION, PROCEDURE, LEVEL, END YEAR, AND CASE CATEGORIES, TREATING PLAINTIFF

.1

.3

Plaintiff Win Rate
.7
.5

.9

PARTIAL WIN AS HALF A WIN

9

11

13
Log Stakes
First Instance

15

Second Instance

Note. See Figure 5.
.
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